Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/325010 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 12019
Publisher: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
We document an overrepresentation of politicians on corporate boards using data for Swiss federal legislators in 1931-2015. However, a close-election regression discontinuity design shows that electoral success explains at most a small part of this overrepresentation. We find small and mostly statistically insignificant causal effects on the probability of having at least one directorship and no effect on the number of directorships. Our results imply that the prevalence of politicians on corporate boards stems from a positive selection of talented individuals in both business and politics, rather than firms hiring politicians to gain political access.
Subjects: 
political connections
politicians
corporate directors
regression discontinuity design
JEL: 
D72
D73
J45
H11
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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