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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 12016
Verlag: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Many democracies allow their legislators to engage in private employment, but the consequences for parliamentary priorities are still poorly understood. We collect large-scale longitudinal data on outside employment and biographic characteristics for all members of the 18th German Bundestag, and link this information to all spoken words and voting behavior in parliament. We present novel evidence that outside employment is associated with parliamentary priorities. Legislators address topics of sectors from which they receive private income more often, are more positive about these sectors, and take a generally more pro-industry stance in legislation. Our results have important implications regarding the independence of legislators.
Schlagwörter: 
MPs' outside earnings
payment of politicians
lobbying
JEL: 
D72
H11
K40
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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