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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 12000
Verlag: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
The ability of private interests to influence the political process is an important topic in economics and political science. While some of these efforts appear as campaign finance and lobbying expenditures in the official record, private interests may also engage in "covert" influence through media capture. In this paper, we systematically examine whether and to what extent corporations in the United States with an interest in slowing climate action might have used corporate advertisement in media outlets as a strategic tool to align such outlets' coverage with their views. Based on several complementary empirical strategies, we find that advertisement spending by such actors (i) increases during election periods and (ii) is associated with both lower and more skeptical-leaning coverage of climate change and climate policy.
Schlagwörter: 
lobbying
advertising
media capture
climate policy
JEL: 
D72
D83
L82
Q54
Q58
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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