Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/324973 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11982
Version Description: 
This Version: August 2025
Publisher: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
Using Chinese firm-level trade data combined with global anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) investigations, we uncover a previously overlooked cost of industrial policy under WTO agreements. At every stage of AD/CVD investigation, subsidies significantly raise the probability of affirmative tariff rulings and lead to higher imposed tariffs. Firms that received larger subsidies are also less likely to be granted firm-specific duties, which are lower than the product-level duties applied to all other firms exporting the investigated product. While AD/CVD duties create a moderate trade barrier that an average Chinese firm expects to face, they represent a significant cost of subsidy for those heavily subsidized and those potentially receiving firm-specific duties. The intended benefits of industrial subsidies are partially offset by increased foreign trade protection: AD/CVD duties induced by subsidies reduced the subsidy effect on firm revenue growth by 22%.
Subjects: 
industrial policy
subsidies
anti-dumping
countervailing duties
JEL: 
F13
L52
O25
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.