Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/324137 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly [ISSN:] 1552-7395 [Volume:] 48 [Issue:] 5 [Publisher:] Sage [Place:] Thousand Oaks, CA [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 998-1022
Publisher: 
Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA
Abstract: 
This study examines whether the agency cost component referred to as “residual loss” differs between nonprofit and shareholder-owned microfinance organizations and whether such costs are further influenced by CEO power. We use operating expenses, asset utilization, liquidity, and tangible asset intensity to proxy for residual loss. Using 374 microfinance organizations located in 76 countries, we find evidence that the residual loss is higher in microfinance organizations incorporated as nonprofits, but only if the CEO is powerful. Our empirical evidence illustrates the importance of installing proper governance mechanisms to minimize costs caused by high managerial power in the nonprofit sector. When CEOs are not powerful, nonprofits appear to have lower residual loss than for-profit organizations do, consistent with a motivated agent perspective. An important message of our study is that traditional agency theory perspectives might be ill-suited to analyze residual loss as a function of the nonprofit versus for-profit organizational form.
Published Version’s DOI: 
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Accepted Manuscript (Postprint)
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