Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/323950 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Kiel Report No. 3
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
This report updates and expands the data-driven work of our initial study from September 2024, which concluded that Europe would only be fit for war in several decades. We show that the situation today is even more concerning if Europe aims to be fit for war by 2030. First, Russia continues to outproduce four European countries across multiple weapon systems. We demonstrate that production must increase by a factor of around five to tilt the balance decisively in Europe's favour. Procurement needs to accelerate and be frontloaded, as delivery delays of three years or more persist. Second, transatlantic tensions are weakening the strength of the U.S. security guarantee. Europe depends heavily on the U.S. not only for readily deployable troops but also for strategic enablers. While overall U.S. weapon imports are not excessive, reliance on American systems in critical modern capabilities remains a concern. Third, military strategy and technology are evolving rapidly. Military planners must modernise weapons and strategy while simultaneously scaling existing and effective systems - a major challenge for often slow and bureaucratic procurement structures. Investment in European technology is essential for modernisation. European weapons tend to be expensive due to low production volumes in a fragmented market; a focus on cost-effectiveness is vital to ensure the EU's planned €800 billion defence spending is sufficient and fiscally sustainable.
Schlagwörter: 
Defence
Armament
Weapon industry
Budget
Germany
Europe
Russia
JEL: 
H41
H56
H60
L64
N44
Dokumentart: 
Research Report

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