Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/323688 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Global Optimization [ISSN:] 1573-2916 [Volume:] 91 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 953-985
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
We propose a framework that allows to quantitatively analyze the interplay of the different agents involved in gas trade and transport in the context of the European entry-exit system. Previous contributions have focused on the case of perfectly competitive buyers and sellers of gas, which allows to replace the respective market equilibrium problem by a single welfare maximization problem. Our novel framework considers the mathematically more challenging case of a monopolistic and thus strategic gas seller. In this framework, the objective functions of the gas sellers and buyers cannot be aggregated into a common objective function, which is why a multilevel formulation is necessary to accurately capture the sequential nature of the decisions taken. For this setup, we derive sufficient conditions that allow for reformulating the challenging four-level model as a computationally tractable single-level reformulation. We prove the correctness of this reformulation and use it for solving several test instances to illustrate the applicability of our approach.
Subjects: 
Multilevel optimization
Reformulations
Gas markets
Market power
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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