Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/323535 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting [ISSN:] 1573-7179 [Volume:] 64 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1221-1259
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
In this article, we investigate accounting deregulation and analyze whether a reduction in the minimum content requirements for quarterly reporting negatively impacts information asymmetry and reduces firm value. Taking advantage of one of the rare deregulating measures, namely the transposition of the EU’s Transparency Directive into German law, and using a novel dataset of firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, we manually examine firms’ quarterly reports for their content elements and construct a new quarterly reporting measure with an ordinal quality dimension. The results show that deregulation reverses beneficial regulatory effects and, on average, increases information asymmetry and decreases firm value. We find that this effect is stronger for first-tier stocks, highlighting the importance of quarterly reporting for these firms. The results are robust to potential selection effects regarding firms’ choice of quarterly reporting content levels.
Subjects: 
Quarterly reporting
Disclosure deregulation
Financial reporting
Interim management statement
Transparency directive
JEL: 
G14
G32
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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