Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/323218 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
KIT Working Paper Series in Economics No. 173
Verlag: 
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON), Karlsruhe
Zusammenfassung: 
We reappraise the Arrow problem by studying the aggregation of choice functions. We do so in the general framework of judgment aggregation, in which choice functions are naturally representable by specifying, for each menu A and each alternative x in A, whether x is choosable from A, or not. Our framework suggests a natural strengthening of Arrow's independence condition positing that the collective choosability of an alternative from a menu depends on the individual views on that issue, and that issue alone. Our analysis reveals that Arrovian impossibility results crucially hinge on what internal consistency requirements we impose on choice functions. While the aggregation of 'binary' choice functions, i.e. those satisfying both contraction (») and expansion (Ú) consistency, is necessarily dictatorial, possibilities in the form of oligarchic rules emerge for path-independent choice functions, that is, when the expansion property Ú is replaced by the so-called Aizerman condition. Remarkably, the Arrovian aggregation of choice functions is shown to be almost dictatorial already under property Ú alone. When giving up expansion consistency, specific quota rules become possible.
Schlagwörter: 
choice function
rationalizability
aggregation theory
independence
Arrow's Theorem
JEL: 
D01
D71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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