Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322986 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
U.S.E. Working Papers Series No. 18-09
Publisher: 
Utrecht University, Utrecht University School of Economics (U.S.E.), Utrecht
Abstract: 
Many international organizations and the vast majority of federations lack exit clauses. Existing theoretical explanations of this stylized fact focus on issues of credible commitment, signaling, and the risk of strategic exploitation. However, such accounts are unable to explain the adoption by the European Union (EU) of Article 50, which allows withdrawal. I theorize and demonstrate empirically that in the case of the EU, an exit-voice logic lies at its origin during the 2002-2003 European Convention. As a protection to undesired policy changes post entry, countries of the 2004 Eastern accession demanded an exit right. Underlying the fear for policy changes was their much lower level of economic development and corresponding differences in policy preferences. As a mirror image, rich outliers like the UK and Denmark also supported Article 50, which likely contributed to its final adoption through the Treaty of Lisbon.
Subjects: 
European Integration
Withdrawal
Secession
European Union
Enlargement
Exit
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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