Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322948 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
U.S.E. Discussion Papers Series No. 16-07
Verlag: 
Utrecht University, Utrecht School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Utrecht
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper theoretically investigates which auctions competing sellers select when they can choose between first-price and second-price auctions, and when risk averse bidders endogenously enter one of the auctions. We first consider bidders' entry decisions between exogenously given auctions, and find that there exists a symmetric entry equilibrium that is characterized by a mixed strategy, which depends on the bidders' degree of absolute risk aversion. In a next step, we endogenize the sellers' choice of auctions. We show that competing sellers have a dominant strategy to select first-price auctions if bidders exhibit nondecreasing absolute risk aversion. If bidders exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion, however, other equilibria exist in which sellers select second-price auctions as well.
Schlagwörter: 
Auctions
Entry decisions
Risk aversion
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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