Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322789 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers Series No. 09-06
Publisher: 
Utrecht University, Utrecht School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Utrecht
Abstract: 
In a two-player stag hunt with asymmetric information, players may lock each other into requiring a large number of confirmations and confirmations of confirmations from one another before eventually acting. This intuition has been formalized in the electronic mail game (EMG). The literature provides extensions on the EMG that eliminate inefficient equilibria, suggesting that no formal rules are needed to prevent players from playing inefficiently. The present paper investigates whether these results extend to the multi-player EMG. We show that standard equilibrium refinements cannot eliminate inefficient equilibria. While two players are predicted to play efficiently, many players need formal rules telling them when who talks to whom.
Subjects: 
Multi-Player Electronic Mail Game
Collective Action
Communication Networks
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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