Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322773 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers Series No. 08-27
Publisher: 
Utrecht University, Utrecht School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Utrecht
Abstract: 
This paper develops a framework for empirically testing several alternative game-theoretic rationales for Horn's rule. It then presents an economic laboratory experiment where these rationales are empirically tested. Subjects seem to coordinate on Horn's rule where efficiency acts as a focal point. Nevertheless, a weak interpretation of the evolutionary argument is not rejected: prior play does have an effect on future play. This suggests a hierarchy of effects, where the focal point effect dominates the evolutionary effect, with the latter being more pronounced in cheap talk situations.
Subjects: 
Horn's Rule
Signalling Theory
Pragmatics
Economic Laboratory Experiment
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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