Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322697 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers Series No. 06-06
Publisher: 
Utrecht University, Utrecht School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Utrecht
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes monetary policy making by a committee of regional representatives in a currency union with asymmetric shocks. By considering strategic delegation of monetary policy making, we show that regional representatives in a federal policy making committee may be more activist than the average citizen in their district. Hence, in our model federal central banks such as the ECB and the FED respond more aggressively to output shocks when compared to individual central banks.
Subjects: 
Central Banking
Asymmetric Shocks
Federations
Strategic Delegation
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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