Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322672 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers Series No. 05-12
Verlag: 
Utrecht University, Utrecht School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Utrecht
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we characterize a situation in which non-calculative trust has to play a role in the decision to cooperate. We then analyze the given situation in game theoretical terms and distinguish those aspects of players' decisions that are cooperative from those that may be interpreted as being trustful. We argue that the cooperative aspect relates to incentives while the trustful (and thus non-calculative) aspect of the decision is related to the framing of the situation.
Schlagwörter: 
trust
framing
focal points
alliances
cooperation
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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