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dc.contributor.authorFellner, Gerlindeen
dc.contributor.authorSausgruber, Ruperten
dc.contributor.authorTraxler, Christianen
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-17-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:02:14Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:02:14Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32253-
dc.description.abstractWe run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong alert effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailing conditions a legal threat that stresses a high detection risk has a significant and highly robust deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others' behavior enhances compliance. However, the information condition has a positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common. Overall, the economic model of crime performs remarkably well in explaining our data.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2009,31en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.jelC93en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordField experimentsen
dc.subject.keywordlaw enforcementen
dc.subject.keywordcomplianceen
dc.subject.keyworddeterrenceen
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen
dc.subject.stwNormbefolgungen
dc.subject.stwFeldforschungen
dc.subject.stwRundfunkfinanzierungen
dc.subject.stwSchuldrechten
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden
dc.titleTesting enforcement strategies in the field: legal threat, moral appeal and social information-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn608968390en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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