Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32246 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2009,21
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Broken Windows: the metaphor has changed New York and Los Angeles. Yet it is far from undisputed whether the broken windows policy was causal for reducing crime. In a series of lab experiments we show that first impressions are indeed causal for cooperativeness in three different institutional environments: absent targeted sanctions; with decentralised punishment; with decentralised punishment qualified by the risk of counterpunishment. In all environments, the effect of first impressions cannot be explained with, but adds to, participants' initial level of benevolence. Mere impression management is not strong enough to stabilise cooperation though. It must be combined with some risk of sanctions.
Schlagwörter: 
Broken Windows
Impression Management
Criminal Policy
Public Good Experiment
JEL: 
C91
D03
D63
H41
K14
K42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.09 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.