Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32243 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2009,23
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate whether and how targeted rebates impede rational switching of consumers from an incumbent to an outside option (e.g., market entrant). In a real trading problem, participants repeatedly buy tokens and can enter a target rebate scheme. Buying in a rebate scheme considerably reduces the likelihood that they switch to a higher-payoff outside option later. We conclude that targeted rebates might have an underestimated potential to foreclose consumer markets. The stickiness effect increases with the increasing number of previous buying in the rebate scheme, but not with the size of the rebate. Prospect Theory can partially account for these effects.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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