Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32242 
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dc.contributor.authorGizatulina, Aliaen
dc.contributor.authorHellwig, Martinen
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-17-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:02:09Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:02:09Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32242-
dc.description.abstractFor an incomplete-information model of public-good provision with interim participation constraints, we show that efficient outcomes can be approximated, with approximately full surplus extraction, when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small. The result holds even if agents' payoffs cannot be unambiguously inferred from their beliefs, i.e., even if the so-called BDP property (Beliefs Determine Preferences) of Neeman (2004) does not hold. The contrary result of Neeman (2004) rests on an implicit uniformity requirement that is incompatible with the notion that agents are informationally small because there are many other agents who have information about them.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2009,28en
dc.subject.jelD40en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.jelD80en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordsurplus extractionen
dc.subject.keywordmechanism designen
dc.subject.keywordBDPen
dc.subject.keywordinformational smallnessen
dc.subject.keywordcorrelated informationen
dc.titleInformational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn608967394en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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