Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32235 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorHellwig, Martinen
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-03-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:02:07Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:02:07Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32235-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the design of optimal utilitarian mechanisms for an excludable public good. Excludability provides a basis for making people pay for admissions; the payments can be used for redistribution and/or funding. Whereas previous work assumed that admissions are governed by the payment or nonpayment of a price, this paper allows for arbitrary admission rules. With sufficient inequality aversion, nondegenerate randomization in admissions is shown to be desirable for certain model specifications, with and without participation constraints. The paper also gives a sufficient condition on the distribution of preferences under which randomization is undesirable.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2009,12en
dc.subject.jelD61en
dc.subject.jelD63en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordUtilitarian welfare maximizationen
dc.subject.keywordAdmission rules for excludable public goodsen
dc.subject.keywordRandomization in optimal mechanismsen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwGebühren
dc.subject.stwUtilitarismusen
dc.subject.stwMechanismen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleUtilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn605797285en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
676.71 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.