Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32232
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dc.contributor.authorBaumann, Florianen_US
dc.contributor.authorFriehe, Timen_US
dc.contributor.authorGrechenig, Kristoffelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-27en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:02:05Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:02:05Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32232-
dc.description.abstractThis article shows that it may be socially optimal to grant accident victims less than full compensation. In our framework, firms are liable under product liability but also invest in care to prevent consumers switching to competitors. Affecting the partition of consumers by means of care-taking is not desirable from a social standpoint. Consequently, it may be optimal to reduce liability below full compensation in order to adjust firms' care incentives.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,03en_US
dc.subject.jelK13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordTort lawen_US
dc.subject.keywordproduct liabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordcare levelen_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordswitchingen_US
dc.titleSwitching consumers and product liability: on the optimality of incomplete strict liabilityen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn617294038en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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