Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32232 
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dc.contributor.authorBaumann, Florianen
dc.contributor.authorFriehe, Timen
dc.contributor.authorGrechenig, Kristoffelen
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-27-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:02:05Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:02:05Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32232-
dc.description.abstractThis article shows that it may be socially optimal to grant accident victims less than full compensation. In our framework, firms are liable under product liability but also invest in care to prevent consumers switching to competitors. Affecting the partition of consumers by means of care-taking is not desirable from a social standpoint. Consequently, it may be optimal to reduce liability below full compensation in order to adjust firms' care incentives.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,03en
dc.subject.jelK13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordTort lawen
dc.subject.keywordproduct liabilityen
dc.subject.keywordcare levelen
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen
dc.subject.keywordswitchingen
dc.titleSwitching consumers and product liability: on the optimality of incomplete strict liability-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn617294038en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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