Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32231 
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dc.contributor.authorBierbrauer, Felixen
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-31-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:02:05Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:02:05Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32231-
dc.description.abstractWe study a large economy model in which individuals have private information about their productive abilities and their preferences for public goods. A mechanism design approach is used to characterize implementable tax and expenditure policies. A robustness requirement in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2005) yields individual incentive compatibility constraints that are equivalent to those in the theory of optimal income taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). Adding a requirement of coalition-proofness yields a set of collective incentive conditions which are akin those in the literature on public goods provision under private information on preferences, in the tradition of Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973).en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2008,39en
dc.subject.jelD71en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordOptimal Taxationen
dc.subject.keywordPublic goods provisionen
dc.subject.keywordRevelation of Preferencesen
dc.subject.keywordRobust Mechanism Designen
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwOffenbarte Präferenzenen
dc.subject.stwMechanismen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleA unified approach to the revelation of public goods preferences and to optimal income taxation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn605758719en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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