Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32231
Authors: 
Bierbrauer, Felix
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008,39
Abstract: 
We study a large economy model in which individuals have private information about their productive abilities and their preferences for public goods. A mechanism design approach is used to characterize implementable tax and expenditure policies. A robustness requirement in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2005) yields individual incentive compatibility constraints that are equivalent to those in the theory of optimal income taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). Adding a requirement of coalition-proofness yields a set of collective incentive conditions which are akin those in the literature on public goods provision under private information on preferences, in the tradition of Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973).
Subjects: 
Optimal Taxation
Public goods provision
Revelation of Preferences
Robust Mechanism Design
JEL: 
D71
D82
H21
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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