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dc.contributor.authorTraxler, Christianen
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-03-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:02:04Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:02:04Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32229-
dc.description.abstractA benchmark result in the political economy of taxation is that majority voting over a linear income tax schedule will result in an inefficiently high tax rate whenever the median voter has a below average income. The present paper examines the role of tax avoidance for this welfare assessment. We find that the inefficiency in the voting equilibrium is the lower, the higher the average level of tax avoidance in the economy, or equivalently, the lower the median voter's amount of avoidance. The result holds for endogenous avoidance and labor choice and, under certain conditions, for an endogenous enforcement policy.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2009,22en
dc.subject.jelH26en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD6en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordTax avoidanceen
dc.subject.keywordwelfare analysisen
dc.subject.keywordmajority votingen
dc.subject.keywordmedian voter equilibriumen
dc.subject.stwSteuervermeidungen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteuertarifen
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteuerpolitiken
dc.subject.stwMedian Voteren
dc.subject.stwSteuerwirkungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleMajority voting and the welfare implications of tax avoidance-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn605805970en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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