Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322237 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
WIDER Working Paper No. 47/25
Publisher: 
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki
Abstract: 
We link a new database of politically exposed persons with the complete register of firms established in Mozambique since Independence. Focusing on the network of connections between firm owners, we use a generalized event study analysis to show that holders of political office achieve significant gains in the number of companies owned and their structural power (centrality) within the business-owner network. These gains are concentrated in joint-stock firms active in provision of business services, and our results persist when we aggregate the data to the family-level. This pattern suggests politicians accumulate private sector wealth by acting as rentier-brokers.
Subjects: 
firm registry
beneficial ownership
political connections
rent-seeking
Mozambique
JEL: 
D72
G30
G38
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-92-9256-606-7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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