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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2008,47
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
The Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) theorem on the undesirability of nonuniform excise taxation when all agents have homogeneous, separable preferences is extended to allow for nonseparability with respect to endogenous variables that will be subject to distortions. The result is useful for analysing models with production and education. For such models, the conclusion of Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), that it is desirable to distort production rather than education choices, is shown to be reversed if the hidden characteristic aþects the cost of education rather than productivity.
Schlagwörter: 
Optimal Taxation
Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem
JEL: 
H21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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