Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32218 
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dc.contributor.authorEngel, Christophen
dc.contributor.authorHennig-Schmidt, Heikeen
dc.contributor.authorIrlenbusch, Bernden
dc.contributor.authorKube, Sebastianen
dc.date.accessioned2009-12-08-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:01:59Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:01:59Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32218-
dc.description.abstractDoes probation pay a double dividend? Society saves the cost of incarceration, and convicts preserve their liberty. But does probation also reduce the risk of recidivism? In a meta-study we show that the field evidence is inconclusive. Moreover it struggles with an identification problem: those put on probation are less likely to recidivate in the first place. We therefore complement the field evidence by a lab experiment that isolates the definitional feature of probation: the first sanction is conditional on being sanctioned again during the probation period. We find that probationers contribute less to a joint project; punishment cost is higher; efficiency is lower; inequity is higher. While experimental subjects are on probation, they increase their contributions to a joint project. However, once the probation period expires, they reduce their contributions. While in the aggregate these two effects almost cancel out, critically those not punished themselves do trust the institution less if punishment does not become effective immediately.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2009,38en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelD03en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.jelK14en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordprobationen
dc.subject.keywordrecidivismen
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen
dc.subject.keywordpunishmenten
dc.subject.keywordexperimental economicsen
dc.titleOn probation: an experimental analysis-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn614481589en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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