Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32209 
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dc.contributor.authorGropp, Reint E.en
dc.contributor.authorHakenes, Hendriken
dc.contributor.authorSchnabel, Isabelen
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-27-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:01:55Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:01:55Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32209-
dc.description.abstractThis paper empirically investigates the effect of government bail-out policies on banks outside the safety net. We construct a measure of bail-out perceptions by using rating information. From there, we construct the market shares of insured competitor banks for any given bank, and analyze the impact of this variable on banks' risk-taking behavior, using a large sample of banks from OECD countries. Our results suggest that government guarantees strongly increase the risk-taking of competitor banks. In contrast, there is no evidence that public guarantees increase the protected banks' risk-taking, except for banks that have outright public ownership. These results have important implications for the effects of the recent wave of bank bail-outs on banks' risk-taking behavior.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,05en
dc.subject.jelG21en
dc.subject.jelG28en
dc.subject.jelL53en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordGovernment bail-outen
dc.subject.keywordimplicit and explicit government guaranteesen
dc.subject.keywordbanking competitionen
dc.subject.keywordrisk-takingen
dc.titleCompetition, risk-shifting, and public bail-out policies-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn617295093en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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