Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32206
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dc.contributor.authorNikiforakis, Nikosen_US
dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theoen_US
dc.contributor.authorWallace, Brianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:01:53Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:01:53Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32206-
dc.description.abstractWe use a public-good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric punishment institutions. Controlling for the average punishment effectiveness of the institutions, we find that asymmetric punishment institutions are as effective in fostering cooperation and as efficient as symmetric institutions. At the individual level, we find that players with higher punishment effectiveness contribute similar amounts to the public account, but have higher earnings and punish more than their weak counterparts.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2009,20en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelD70en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Gruppeen_US
dc.subject.stwStrafeen_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleAsymmetric enforcement of cooperation in a social dilemmaen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn60580513Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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