Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32206 
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dc.contributor.authorNikiforakis, Nikosen
dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theoen
dc.contributor.authorWallace, Brianen
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-03-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:01:53Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:01:53Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32206-
dc.description.abstractWe use a public-good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in asymmetric and symmetric punishment institutions. Controlling for the average punishment effectiveness of the institutions, we find that asymmetric punishment institutions are as effective in fostering cooperation and as efficient as symmetric institutions. At the individual level, we find that players with higher punishment effectiveness contribute similar amounts to the public account, but have higher earnings and punish more than their weak counterparts.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2009,20en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelD70en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwSoziale Gruppeen
dc.subject.stwStrafeen
dc.subject.stwEntscheidungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleAsymmetric enforcement of cooperation in a social dilemma-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn60580513Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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