Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322042 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 3031
Verlag: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper explores the impact of bank transparency on market efficiency by comparing banks that disclose supervisory capital requirements to those that remain opaque. Due to the informational content of supervisory capital requirements for the market this opacity might hinder market efficiency. The paper estimates an average 11.5% reduction in funding costs for transparent versus opaque banks. However, there is some heterogeneity in those effects. Transparency helps the market to sort across safer and riskier banks. Conditional on disclosure, the safest quartile of banks, those with a CET1 P2R lower than 1.5% of risk-weighted assets, benefits in average from 31.1% lower funding costs. The paper concludes that supervisory transparency is beneficial, supporting the view that supervisory transparency enhances market discipline by allowing markets to better evaluate and price the risk associated with each bank.
Schlagwörter: 
Bank transparency
market efficiency
market discipline
supervisory effectiveness
JEL: 
D5
E5
E58
G18
G21
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-92-899-7118-8
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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