Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32152
Authors: 
Hodder, James E.
Jackwerth, Jens Carsten
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper series // Zentrum für Finanzen und Ökonometrie, Universität Konstanz 2005,01
Abstract: 
Previous papers have argued that trading restrictions can result in a typical employee stock option having a subjective value (certainty equivalent value) that is substantially less than its Black-Scholes value. However, these analyses ignore the manager's ability to (at least partially) control the risk level within the firm. In this paper, we show how managerial control can lead to such options having much larger certainty equivalent values for employees who can exercise control. We also show that the potential for early exercise is substantially less valuable with managerial control. The certainty equivalent value for a European option with managerial control can easily exceed the Black-Scholes value for a comparable option without control. However, it is questionable whether Black-Scholes is an appropriate benchmark for an option where the underlying process exhibits controlled volatility. We show how to obtain a risk-neutral valuation for such an option. That risk-neutral value can be substantially greater or less than the Black- Scholes value. Furthermore, the option's certainty equivalent value can also be greater or less than its risk-neutral value.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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