Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32086 
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dc.contributor.authorHelm, Carstenen
dc.contributor.authorNeugart, Michaelen
dc.date.accessioned2008-12-15-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:57:20Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:57:20Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32086-
dc.description.abstractWith ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by coalition parties, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. Therefore, in coalition governments reforms will be more in line with policy requirements than in single-party governments. This is usually beneficial for the coalition parties as well as for the voter.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aTechnische Universität Darmstadt, Department of Law and Economics |cDarmstadten
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDarmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics |x192en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD78en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordAsymmetric informationen
dc.subject.keywordcoalition governmentsen
dc.subject.keywordpolicy reformen
dc.subject.stwPolitische Reformen
dc.subject.stwPolitische Entscheidungen
dc.subject.stwRegierungskoalitionen
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwPolitisches Zielen
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen
dc.titleCoalition governments and policy reform with asymmetric information-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn588004111en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:darddp:dar_35489en

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