Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32086
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHelm, Carstenen_US
dc.contributor.authorNeugart, Michaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-12-15en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:57:20Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:57:20Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32086-
dc.description.abstractWith ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by coalition parties, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. Therefore, in coalition governments reforms will be more in line with policy requirements than in single-party governments. This is usually beneficial for the coalition parties as well as for the voter.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisher|aTechnische Universität Darmstadt, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre |cDarmstadt
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDarmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics|x192
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330
dc.subject.keywordAsymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcoalition governmentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolicy reformen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Reformen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Entscheidungen_US
dc.subject.stwRegierungskoalitionen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitisches Zielen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen_US
dc.titleCoalition governments and policy reform with asymmetric information
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.identifier.ppn588004111en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:darddp:dar_35489-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
413.71 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.