Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32077
Authors: 
Rupp, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 171
Abstract: 
Guided by game theory we develop a model to explain behavioral equilibria under uncertainty and interaction with the spot market on balancing markets. We offer some insights for the general model and derive explicit solutions for a specific model in which the error distributions and pricing function are given. The most interesting conclusions are the unique existence of an equilibrium and that no participant acts contrary to the aggregate market (either all market participants buy or sell power) and all strategies are, normalized properly, equal (which is rather counterintuitive). Furthermore the aggregate behavior is a stochastic process varying around its own variance.
Subjects: 
game theory
nash equilibrium
regulated energy market
balancing power
JEL: 
C73
D58
Q41
D40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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