Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320696 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Illicit Economies and Development (JIED) [ISSN:] 2516-7227 [Volume:] 6 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 42-47
Publisher: 
LSE Press, London
Abstract: 
What are the dangers of states using criminal groups for national defense? This article evaluates this question in the context of Ukraine's response to the 2022 Russian invasion. It lays out what is currently known about Kyiv's use of criminal groups as part of its defense efforts, specifically for intelligence-gathering and for bolstering military manpower. Wartime arrangements with criminal actors, however, could compound corruption concerns among citizens that undermine their trust in the state. Such arrangements might entrench a pre-war perception that criminal groups wield influence over state institutions. The state granting leniency to criminal actors in exchange for wartime support could also reduce already low confidence in Ukraine's criminal justice system. While leveraging criminal groups may be necessary for defense purposes, Ukrainian authorities should remain cognizant of the trade-offs involved - some of which may not become evident until the post-war period.
Subjects: 
Ukraine
crime-state relations
war
prosecutions
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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