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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Quantitative Economics [ISSN:] 1759-7331 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 235-266
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a nonparametric and ordinal approach for testing pure strategy Nash equilibrium play in games with monotone best responses, such as those with strategic complements/substitutes. The approach makes minimal assumptions on unobserved heterogeneity, requires no parametric assumptions on payoff functions, and no restriction on equilibrium selection from multiple equilibria. The approach can also be extended in order to make inferences and predictions. Both model-testing and inference can be implemented by a tractable computation procedure based on column generation. To illustrate how our approach works, we include an application to an IO entry game.
Schlagwörter: 
Revealed preference
monotone comparative statics
single-crossingdifferences
supermodular games
revealed monotonicity axiom
JEL: 
C1
C6
C7
D4
L1
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
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