Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320267 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 19 [Issue:] 3 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1305-1349
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
We analyze a vote-buying model where the members of a committee vote on a proposal important to a vote buyer. Each member incurs a privately-drawn disutility if the proposal passes. We characterize the cheapest combination of bribes that guarantees the proposal passes in all equilibria. When members vote simultaneously, the number of bribes is at least 50% larger than the number of votes required to pass the proposal (vote threshold). The number of bribes increases with the dispersion of the disutility distribution and all members are bribed with sufficient dispersion. A proportional increase in the number of members and the vote threshold leads to a less-than-proportional increase in capture cost, and the cost may increase with the vote threshold. With sequential voting and disutility distribution $U[0,1]$, all members are bribed and bribes are equal. Finally, sequential voting increases capture cost in small committees and decreases it in large committees.
Subjects: 
Vote buying
committee
JEL: 
D71
D72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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