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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 19 [Issue:] 3 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1001-1026
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
I study a persuasion game between a privately informed agent and a decision maker (DM) who can imperfectly verify the statements made by the agent by observing a signal that is correlated with the agent's information. I find that whether or not the DM benefits from communicating with the agent depends on whether the DM's signal and the agent's private information satisfy a weak affiliation condition. I then discuss the significance of this result to the debate over the use of self-appraisals in business. I argue that, in general, self-appraisals are only useful when the workers' abilities are multidimensional.
Schlagwörter: 
Communication
verification
self-appraisals
mechanism design
JEL: 
C72
D82
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