Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320248 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 19 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 605-634
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probability can be implemented as a convex combination of two families of deterministic voting rules: qualified majority and qualified anti-majority. We also provide analogous results by requiring implementation by a symmetric monotone (strategy-proof) voting rule and by a symmetric unanimous voting rule. We apply our results to show that an ex ante Rawlsian rule is a convex combination of a pair of qualified majority rules.
Subjects: 
monotone reduced form
ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility
Reduced-form voting
unanimous voting
JEL: 
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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