Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320245 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 19 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 551-564
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
We revisit the classical object reallocation problem under strict preferences. When attention is constrained to the set of Pareto-efficient rules, it is known that top trading cycles (TTC) is the only rule that is strategy-proof and individually rational. We relax this constraint and consider pair efficiency. A rule is pair-efficient if it never induces an allocation at which a pair of agents gain from trading their assigned objects. Remarkably, even in the larger set of pair-efficient rules, we find that TTC is still the only rule that is strategy-proof and individually rational. Our characterization result gives strong support to the use of TTC in object reallocation problems.
Schlagwörter: 
individually rational
Indivisible object
pair efficient
strategy-proof
top trading cycles
JEL: 
C78
D61
D63
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
151.67 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.