Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32018
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLambsdorff, Johannen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:54:54Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:54:54Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32018-
dc.description.abstractThe objectives of government are pivotal to understanding the diverse negative effects of corruption on public welfare. Corruption renders governments unable or unwilling to maximize welfare. In the first case, it distorts agents’ decisions and limits the contractual space available to agents and the government, acting as a benevolent principal. In the second case, a corrupt principal creates allocative inefficiencies, cripples its credible commitment to effective policies, and opens the door to opportunism.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for European, Governance and Economic Development Research |cGöttingenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCeGE Discussion Paper |x9en_US
dc.subject.jelD61en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelK4en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordwelfareen_US
dc.subject.keywordprincipal-agent-theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordrent-seekingen_US
dc.subject.keywordx-inefficiencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordkleptocracyen_US
dc.subject.keywordopportunismen_US
dc.titleHow corruption in government affects public welfare: A review of theoryen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn500238685en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cegedp:9-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
206.99 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.