Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320125 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11904
Verlag: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Raising the retirement age is a common policy response when social security schemes face fiscal pressures. We develop and estimate a dynamic life cycle model to study optimal retirement and tax policy when individuals face health shocks and income risk and make endogenous retirement decisions. The model incorporates key features of Social Security, Medicare, income taxation, and savings incentives and distinguishes three channels through which health affects retirement: nonconvexities in labor supply due to health-dependent fixed costs of working, earnings reductions, and mortality risk. We estimate our model to match US microdata and show that labor supply nonconvexities play a dominant role in driving early retirement, making rigid increases in the retirement age welfare reducing. In contrast, more flexible policies, such as increasing the dependence of Social Security benefits on the claiming age, can improve welfare and pay for themselves with a fiscal surplus. We map a range of policy reforms to their marginal values of public funds (MVPFs), showing that certain incentives to delay claiming offer MVPFs of infinity while broad-based retirement age increases have negative willingness-to-pay. These findings offer novel retirement policy prescriptions and challenge the prevailing emphasis on raising the retirement age.
Schlagwörter: 
flexible retirement
optimal taxation
social security reform
life cycle model
health shocks
retirement decisions
marginal value of public funds (MVPF)
labor supply nonconvexities
mortality risk
medicare
JEL: 
H21
H55
J26
D15
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.