Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320101 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11880
Publisher: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
We characterize 'Games of Altruistic Cooperation' as a class of games in which cooperation leaves the individual and the group of decision-makers worse off than defection, but favors individuals outside the group. An example is climate change mitigation. In this context, we experimentally investigate whether decentralized institutions using costly punishment and/or communication support altruistic cooperation to sustain the welfare of future generations. Without punishment or communication, cooperation is low; communication alone even increases the incidence of zero contributions. However, combining peer punishment with communication strongly increases cooperation, showing that an effective decentralized solution to a Game of Altruistic Cooperation exists.
Subjects: 
games of altruistic cooperation
social dilemma
intergenerational good game
punishment
communication
JEL: 
C92
D74
H41
Q54
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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