Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31958 
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dc.contributor.authorGubaydullina, Zuliaen
dc.contributor.authorBizer, Kilianen
dc.date.accessioned2009-04-28-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:53:48Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:53:48Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31958-
dc.description.abstractThe paper aims at defining the role of intentions for reciprocity. The ultimatum game is modified, by adding a kind of randomizer (Chinese Whisper), to generate outcomes which are not intended und thus to separate the proposers' initial intentions from their actual offers. The mechanism ensures that the responder reacts to changing intentions and not to changing outcomes. This experimental approach also has the advantage that the number of available options for the proposer is not limited. Our evidence supports the view that fairness theory should explicitly address intentions responders exhibit different acceptance rates depending on the intentions of proposers.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aGeorg-August-Universität Göttingen, Volkswirtschaftliches Seminar |cGöttingenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiskussionsbeiträge |x135en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordFairnessen
dc.subject.keywordReciprocityen
dc.subject.keywordIntentionen
dc.subject.keywordUltimatum gameen
dc.titleTracing fairness intentions: Chinese whisper-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn598706259en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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