Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319546 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] International Trade, Politics and Development (ITPD) [ISSN:] 2632-122X [Volume:] 3 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 82-99
Publisher: 
Emerald, Leeds
Abstract: 
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine a curvilinear effect of legislative constraints on foreign debt. Design/methodology/approach - A cross-sectional, time-series data analysis of 68 developing countries during the period from 1981 to 1999 was performed. Findings - Foreign borrowing is most likely to increase at both low and high levels of legislative constraints, while it is most likely to decrease at moderate levels. Originality/value - The paper is a first-cut empirical analysis of a curvilinear relationship between legislative constraints and foreign debt.
Subjects: 
The executive
Legislative veto players
Foreign debt
Curvilinear effect
Empirical analysis
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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