Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319538 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Verlag: 
ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
It is commonly believed that common ownership deters entry by internalizing market competition which warrants pro-competitive entry regulations. Using a successive oligopoly model with common ownership, we challenge this conventional wisdom. We show that if the downstream sector alone operates under common ownership, entry is always socially excessive, i.e., more firms enter the market than is socially optimal. In contrast, when the upstream sector alone operates under common ownership, entry is socially excessive (insufficient) if the degree of common ownership in the upstream market is reasonably low (high). Finally, when both sectors are characterized by common ownership, entry is socially excessive if the degree of ownership in the downstream market is stronger than that in the upstream market. Therefore, our findings provide a rationale for anti-competitive, rather than pro-competitive entry regulations.
Schlagwörter: 
Common Ownership
Excessive Entry
Insufficient Entry
Successive Oligopoly
JEL: 
D43
L11
L13
L22
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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