Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319134 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 17865
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Restraints clauses that prevent workers from joining (or starting) a competing firm (non-compete clauses), the disclosure of confidential information or the poaching of former co-workers or clients are traditionally justified to protect legitimate business interests (e.g. trade secrets, investments in training). Yet, there are increasing concerns that such clauses may be deployed to suppress job mobility and competition. This paper reviews the international evidence base and finds that non-compete clauses are more prevalent than anticipated, with up to one-quarter of employees subject to such clauses in some countries. These clauses extend beyond highly paid professionals to include low-wage and elementary workers, often bundled with other restrictions, further diminishing workers' bargaining power. The balance of evidence suggests that non-compete clauses suppress job mobility, firm entry, innovation, wages and productivity, which more than offset any gains from enhanced incentives for firm-specific investment. Regulatory efforts to limit non-compete clauses are gaining traction in some countries but comprehensive empirical evidence remains scarce outside the United States, underscoring the need for more research.
Schlagwörter: 
non-compete clauses
monopsony
earnings
knowledge diffusion
mobility
JEL: 
J31
J41
J42
L40
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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