Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319126 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 17857
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
During the first half of the twentieth century, many US states enacted laws restricting women's labor market opportunities, including maximum hours restrictions, minimum wage laws, and night-shift bans. The era of so-called protective labor laws came to an end in the 1960s as a result of civil rights reforms. In this paper, we investigate the political economy behind the rise and fall of these laws. We argue that the main driver behind protective labor laws was men's desire to shield themselves from labor market competition. We spell out the mechanism through a politico-economic model in which singles and couples work in different sectors and vote on protective legislation. Restrictions are supported by single men and couples with male sole earners who compete with women for jobs. We show that the theory's predictions for when protective legislation will be introduced are well supported by US state-level evidence.
Schlagwörter: 
structural transformation
labor market competition
women's rights
political economy
protective legislation
family economics
gender
JEL: 
D13
D72
D78
E24
J12
J16
N30
O10
O43
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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