Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319105 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 17836
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Public service reforms often provoke political backlash. Can they also yield political benefits for the politicians who champion them? We study a Wisconsin law that weakened teachers' unions and liberalized pay, prompting mass protests. Exploiting its staggered implementation across school districts, we find that the reform cut union revenues, raised student test scores, and increased pay for some teachers. Exposure to the law increased the incumbent governor's vote share by about 20% of his margin of victory and reduced campaign contributions to his opponent. Gains were larger in districts with stronger unions ex ante and in those where more voters benefited from the reform. Our findings highlight how even politically risky reforms can generate electoral benefits under the right circumstances.
Subjects: 
Teacher Salaries
Collective Bargaining
Political Feasibility
Education Reform
JEL: 
I20
P46
P11
J31
J45
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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