Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/318624 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Citation: 
[Journal:] Environmental and Resource Economics [ISSN:] 1573-1502 [Volume:] 88 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer Netherlands [Place:] Dordrecht [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 249-278
Publisher: 
Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes international environmental agreements in three-stage games consisting of a membership subgame, the signatories' decision on the intensity of cooperation, and an emissions subgame. Signatories may act as Stackelberg leaders or play Nash. In the Stackelberg game, the highest intensity of cooperation between signatories is optimal. In the Nash game, a moderate or the highest intensity of cooperation is optimal if emissions are strategic substitutes. In this case the equilibrium emissions and the stable coalition of the Nash game with optimal cooperation intensity are identical to the equilibrium emissions and the stable coalition of the Stackelberg game with the highest cooperation intensity. Finally, we apply our results to coalition formation games of the literature. In the applied Nash games, optimizing with respect to the cooperation intensity may enlarge the stable coalition up to the grand coalition which implements the first best.
Subjects: 
Optimal intensity of cooperation
Stable coalition
Nash
Stackelberg
JEL: 
C71
F55
Q54
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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