Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31762
Authors: 
Regner, Tobias
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2009,035
Abstract: 
We analyse pricing, effort and tipping decisions in the online service Google Answers. While users set a price for the answer to their question ex ante, they can additionally give a tip to the researcher ex post. In line with the related experimental literature we find evidence that tipping is motivated by reciprocity, but also by reputation concerns among frequent users. Moreover, researchers seem to adjust their eþort based on the user.s previous tipping behaviour. An efficient sorting takes place when enough tip history is available. Users known for tipping in the past receive higher effort answers, while users with an established reputation for non-tipping tend to get low effort answers. In addition, we analyse how tipping is adopted when the behavioural default is not to tip and estimate minimum levels for the fraction of genuine reciprocator and imitator types.
Subjects: 
social preferences
reciprocity
moral hazard
reputation
Internet
psychological game theory
JEL: 
C24
C70
C93
D82
L86
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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